A Secure Fingerprint Authentication Protocol by Salaiwarakul, Anongporn
  e-ISSN: 2289-8131   Vol. 10  No. 1-5 59 
 








Abstract—This article proposes authentication specifications 
and a framework for the fingerprint authentication in the 
circumstance that the presentation of the user’s biometric 
information is not supervised. The specifications of the security 
properties are to certify that the liveness of the user’s fingerprint 
information is confirmed and that the intention of the user’s 
authentication is not manipulative or illegal. The framework for 
compliance with the specification of the fingerprint 
authentication protocol is proposed. Liveness detection by the 
fingerprint reader is considered to be essential in these 
situations. Cryptography and the fresh random number, nonce, 
are included in the framework. Analysis of the authentication 
framework shows that the proposed security properties are 
confirmed, the user’s biometric data is secured and the user’s 
intention of authentication is preserved. 
 
Index Terms—Biometric; Fingerprint Authentication 





Biometric authentication uses behavior characteristics of the 
user and their physical traits to identify the user’s identity. 
Typing patterns or signature styles are examples of user’s 
characteristics that can be used to determine the identity of a 
user. However, the difficulty of distinguishing a user’s 
characteristics is complicated as the user may present their 
style differently at different times. A user’s physical traits, 
such as their iris, hand geometry, or fingerprints allow easier 
recognition each time the user presents them for verification, 
this being the reason that user physical characteristics are 
widely used for user authentication. 
Biometric authentication in supervised situations is secure 
and identifiable since the user’s biometrics is difficult to steal 
or fraudulently use without the user being aware, thereby 
ensuring that the user’s identity is correctly determined. In the 
supervised situation it is implied that the biometric 
authentication process is monitored by the system’s verifier. 
This prevents the user’s biometric data bypassing the 
authentication device, such as biometric reader. The user’s 
biometric data itself can be used to actually authenticate the 
user’s identity. The security of the biometric data must be of 
paramount concern in terms of privacy protection and 
information security.  
While the strength of using biometric data as a means of 
authenticating the user is now well understood, using 
biometric authentication in unsupervised situations must still 
be considered as a weakness. Unsupervised biometric 
authentication situations include, for example, online 
transactions which include authentication of the user by using 
that user’s biometric data.  
During unsupervised biometric authentication, the verifier 
has no means to guarantee the user’s identity and/or their 
liveness. Liveness in the user’s biometric authentication 
refers to the situation where the user’s biometrics are not 
being reused or replayed from previous transactions. 
Liveness therefore requires new or ‘fresh’ biometrics 
availability, thus confirming that it is the real, correct, user 
attempting to authenticate themselves to the biometric 
authentication system on this particular occasion. 
An approach to protecting the user’s privacy in biometric 
authentication was proposed by [1], in which the user’s 
identity is hidden during the biometric authentication process. 
However, this approach cannot be used in the situation that 
the user’s identity must be presented such as in on-line 
banking transactions where the user’s ID links to the account 
for verification purposes, so must be known.  
Research published in [2] proposed an online bank 
transaction processing approach using biometric 
authentication which establishes a secure transaction between 
the online banking software running on the client computer 
and on the banking server computer. The research proposed 
that the biometric device at the client end should establish the 
secure connection to the server; this however is not supported 
by current technology. Also, the important aspect of the 
liveness of the user presentation is still questionable and 
needs further consideration. 
Strong protection of the user’s biometric data in remote 
biometric authentication situations is illustrated in [3]. Here, 
token storage of biometric data is required to secure the 
biometric data. Hence, it becomes an imperative to manage 
the token and token reader.  
Given the variety of options, and perceived shortcomings 
of the various approaches discussed so far, our research 
presents specifications to which the fingerprint authentication 
protocol should comply, and a secure compliance framework 
for fingerprint authentication when the fingerprint data is 
used in the unsupervised situation and should be analysed to 
confirm its security properties. 
This situation is discussed in the two dimensions of the 
fingerprint authentication framework. First, the background 
information and knowledge necessary to support the process 
are presented. Subsequently, the discussion is illustrating the 
importance of verifying the security properties of the protocol 
and/or framework. The tools available to be used to analyse 
the security protocol are shown and discussed. Our 
conclusions, in part, summarize the contribution of the 
research and the advantages of the proposed framework. 
 
II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
A. Biometric Authentication  
Biometric Authentication Process: There are two main 
processes in authentication using the user’s biometrics as a 
means of identification: the enrollment process and the 
biometric data verification process. For the enrollment 
process, the user is required to enroll, or register, their 
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biometric code in the system. This data is stored securely in 
the system’s repository for later use. Once the user has been 
asked for their biometric authentication action, their 
biometric data is presented to the system and verified against 
the stored biometric code. This is the verification process. 
The result of the biometric verification process will either be 
a match or a non-match [4,5]. After a match, the system will 
allow the user to proceed with their request based upon the 
successful matching result. 
Biometric Authentication Device: In a biometric 
authentication system, the system involves a biometric 
reader, the user interface, and storage. The biometric reader 
is a device to acquire the user’s biometric data. The reader 
and the related software will transform the data into a form 
that can be stored in the repository or it can be matched 
against the stored biometric code in the verification process. 
The user interface will connect the user with the biometric 
system. This will facilitate the user’s connection with the 
system or with the biometric reader. The biometric data can 
be stored in the user’s token (smart card, for example) or any 
other database. The user’s biometric code can be stored 
securely in the smart card which the user can carry with them. 
If the user is required to carry out the biometric user 
authentication, the user’ stored biometric code is read from 
the smart card and will be matched in the matching process 
against the user’s presented biometric data. 
In the networking scenario, the user’s biometric data can be 
stored in the system’s database which may be remotely 
hosted, or hosted in the Cloud. The stored biometric code will 
be transferred to the matching stage so that the user can be 
authenticated via the public workstation. 
 
B. Security Properties Verification 
The security protocol and/or framework is highly error-
prone. Many proposed and well-known security protocols 
have been found to have weaknesses and to be prone to 
attacks [6, 7]. An unproven security protocol is a serious 
threat when it is used for communicating data which needs to 
be secure and protected.  
Verifying the security framework will ensure the 
soundness of the security properties of the proposed model 
and ensure that it provides sufficient security properties, 
according to its claims. 
Traditional techniques to verify the security framework, 
using formal verification methods which transform the 
processes in the framework into finite states, is error-prone 
due to the difficulty of correctly and completely identifying 
flaws in the finite state model. Automated verification, 
analysis and detection techniques based on programmed rules 
or symbolic models, are likely to be significantly more 
successful than human scrutiny. Programmed tools currently 
available include AVISPA [8], ProVerif [9], or Scyther [10]. 
 
III. UNSUPERVISED FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION 
SPECIFICATIONS AND PROTOCOL 
 
A. The Specifications  
In order to guarantee the security of the biometric data used 
in the authentication protocol, the security properties of the 
protocol should be clarified and, together with the operational 
parameters of the protocol, should be clearly stated. The 
protocol should preserve the privacy and the secrecy of the 
biometric data as well as ensure the authenticity of the user. 
The security and verification properties of the device must 
guarantee that the protocol can not be bypassed in the user’s 
biometric authentication process. Bypassing can be done 
during user’s biometric data presentation or at the time of the 
matching process, and the result of the matching can be 
replayed. For example, bypassing the authentication process 
can be done during presentation of the user’s biometric data 
by using a fake rubber fingerprint [11, 12]. The biometric 
device must be able to detect the difference between a fake 
fingerprint and a natural fingerprint of a living person. At the 
time that the presented biometric data is being matched with 
the stored biometric code in the matching process, the stolen 
genuine biometric data could be replaced by the intruder, who 
can then keep and subsequently replay that data. The security 
specifications of the protocol must contemplate and prevent 
all such possibilities for fraudulent access. 
Under unsupervised fingerprint authentication, the 
fingerprint reader is one of the key devices that an intruder 
can intercept (other devices include the controlling computer 
and the network connecting the data reader with the 
computer). A malicious fingerprint reader can capture the 
legitimate user’s biometric data and later use it as the 
intruder’s own data. To secure against such an intrusion, the 
fingerprint reader must be verified as secure against software 
intrusion, such as placing of a Trojan or other manipulative 
software, before the user’s biometric data detection takes 
place. 
Moreover, in an unsupervised fingerprint authentication, an 
intruder can place the captured biometric data of the 
legitimate user on the fingerprint reader without the 
authentication administrator being aware. A scenario might 
be an intruder captures the user’s biometric data e.g. a 
fingerprint a user has left on a public computer or glass from 
which the intruder can generate a rubber finger with the 
fingerprint of the legitimate user. A test of this scenario 
showed successfully biometric authentication [11]. Liveness 
detection technology in the fingerprint reader, as proposed in 
our specification of the protocol to prevent success 
authentication of fake fingerprint data, would ideally detect 
the temperature or blood pulse of the biometric implement 
physically placed on the reader. A fake rubber finger, as in 
the scenario described, would probably be immediately 
detected and access disallowed.  To achieve this, the liveness 
detection flag is included in the proposed framework (detail 
is illustrated in section IV) to indicate that this is live data. 
Hence, even where the legitimate user fingerprint data is 
captured by an intruder, it cannot be successfully 
authenticated when compared against the legitimate data own 
in the proposed biometric authentication protocol. 
In a flawed security protocol, an attacker can replace his 
biometric data with the legitimate data as it is being 
transmitted via the network. He can intercept messages sent 
between the fingerprint reader device which is reading his 
own biometric data, and the authentication matching server. 
Then the attacker can insert the biometric data of the 
legitimate user into the protocol in the biometric matching 
process. It is therefore essential to secure the protocol by 
introducing encryption methods and nonces. 
A positive matching result of the previous user’s 
authentication can be replayed in a defect authentication 
protocol. A replay attack of the message transmitted can be 
solved using nonces as well as the user’s identity which 
should be appended to the matching result. Hence, the 
recipient of the matching result can verify the freshness of the 
received message.  
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B. The Secure Fingerprint Authentication Protocol 
To preserve the security properties of the protocol, all 
components involved in the protocol should be considered 
secure. These include the fingerprint reader, matching server, 
and all communication channels. As mentioned, a fingerprint 
reader in an unsupervised environment can be tampered with 
by an intruder who can insert malicious software and capture 
the legitimate user’s biometric data. Therefore, the 
fingerprint reader should be able to be proven secure before 
the user enters their biometric data. A Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) can be applied to guarantee the device as 
tamper-proof [13]. The TPM is applied in the protocol to 
confirm the integrity of the components involved in the 
system. Upon the system boot-up, the TPM is responsible to 
carry out the integrity checking of the platform and all 
peripheral devices, which includes the attached fingerprint 
reader if biometric authentication is practiced. This check will 
verify that the system configuration has, or has not, changed 
from the previous configuration. If the system has been 
manipulated by an attacker, that value state will have 
changed. The user who is about to place their fingerprint on 
the detection device can be certain that they can trust this 
system. Hence, the TPM included in the proposed protocol 
protects the biometric data from being stolen or captured and 
subsequently misused. 
 The communication channels are easily interfered with by 
an attacker. A powerful attacker such as Dolev-Yao style 
adversary can play with messages. Therefore, to secure the 
protocol, the messages should be encrypted and the 
recipient’s identity should be included in the messages. 
 
I.  USER -> FINGERPRINT READER  
      FP, REQUEST 
II. FINGERPRINT READER -> MATCHING SERVER 
     {{LD}skBR, {FP}skTPM, ID, n1, TPM, request}pkMS 
III. MATCHING SERVER  ->  SERVICE 
     {{result}skMS, ID, request, n2}pkService 
 
Figure 1: Communication messages for a secure fingerprint protocol 
 
 Figure 1 shows the communication messages sequence for 
the fingerprint authentication protocol. The scenario of the 
protocol is that the client wishes to request service and is 
required to authenticate himself by entering his fingerprint 
data. The user is requested to place his fingerprint (FP) on 
fingerprint reader. The user trusts the fingerprint reader he is 
using by verifying the TPM states. The fingerprint reader has 
liveness detection so that the live presentation of the user’s 
biometric data is guaranteed; the matching server can verify 
this before proceeding to the matching process. Upon 
receiving the verified data, the matching server deciphers the 
message. It validates the liveness detection (LD) ‘flag’ from 
the fingerprint reader via the fingerprint reader’s signature. 
The origin of the fingerprint data is also checked to ensure it 
was sent from a trusted TPM. The biometric data is matched 
with the stored biometric code of the user’s identity (ID). The 
freshness of the message is proved by nonce n1. To prevent 
the replay attack where the matching result message is sent 
from the matching server (MS) to the service, the nonce n2 is 
generated. The matching result is signed with the signature of 
the matching server. The user’s identity and the user’s request 
are also appended to the message to confirm the purpose of 
the user’s biometric authentication. The messages are 
encrypted by public key cryptography to secure their 
confidentially. 
IV. THE PROTOCOL EVALUATION 
 
Evaluating the security protocol is crucial. The result of the 
evaluation can confirm the properties that the secure protocol 
promises to the user. 
In order to evaluate the correctness and security properties 
of the proposed protocol, ProVerif is used as an evaluation 
tool. ProVerif is an automatic protocol verifier for analyzing 
the security properties of the protocol. When analyzing the 
protocol, ProVerif provides a Dolev-Yao Style attacker in 
order to detect flaws or any violations of the security 
properties in the protocol. A Dolev-Yao Style attacker is 
named after the original proposers of the idea that an intruder 
who is likely to attack the security protocol would have the 
capability to manipulate messages communicating in the 
network. A Dolev-Yao style attacker can listen, intercept and 
replay the messages [14]. Analysing the security protocol 
using the verifier that establishes this style of adversary will 
guarantee more security measures in the protocol.   The 
ProVerif model of a protocol is assembled in Applied Pi 
calculus form. 
 The ProVerif model is assembled in the same way that 
messages are communicated between components. Messages 
being sent in a public channel are the reason to verify whether 
an attacker could acquire the transmitted data. The 
components are modeled as processes in ProVerif, and each 
of which is responsible for both creating and obtaining 
messages. The process verifies the received message to check 
whether it is the original and was sent from the claimed 
participant. The detail data in the message, such as 
encryption, nonces and signature, are verified to ensure that 
the messages are not inserted by an intruder.  
 
A. ProVerif Model 
There are four processes involved in the ProVerif model 
corresponding to the proposed protocol: client process, 
fingerprintReader process, matchingServer process and 
service process, each of which corresponds to activities of the 
client, fingerprint reader, matching server, and requesting 
service respectively. 
The user process generates the user’s fingerprint data and 
the user’s request and sends this out to the public channel, Ch. 
The private key of the fingerprint reader is received securely 
via the private channel, privCh, which represents that it is 
distributed from the trusted key distributor. It also expects to 
receive the message sent from the user which includes the 
user’s biometric data.  In order to demonstrate that the 
biometric reader is reading the live presentation of the 
biometric data, the LD is generated. The authenticity of the 
user is guaranteed via the user’s ID. Nonce n1 is included to 
confirm the freshness of the message. The whole message is 
encrypted by the public key of the matching server and 
transmitted via the public channel. In this scenario, the 
matching server is responsible for verifying the stored 
biometric code against the presented biometric data and 
revealing the matching result. The matching server process 
receives its private key securely from the key distributor. It 
also looks for the received message which includes the 
biometric data read from the fingerprint reader. Once the 
message is received, it is deciphered. The matching result is 
presumably generated and encrypted with the matching 
server’s public key. The service process receives the message 
from the public channel and deciphers the message. The main 
process is responsible for generating the keys and distributing 
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them to other processes as well as running all processes 
concurrently. The ProVerif model of the protocol is shown in 
Figure 2. 
When all processes run concurrently, ProVerif will 
generate a Dolev-Yao adversary according to the designed 
model. In the analysis part of ProVerif, the verifier will ask if 
an intruder could reach the secret that the protocol wishes to 
keep. 
 
let user =  
new FP 
new request 
out(Ch,(FP,request))     
 








    sign((FP),skTPM),ID,n1,TPM,request),pkMS)) 
 
let matchingServer = 
in(privChMS,skMS) 
in(Ch,m2) 
  let(m3,m4,IDx,nx1,=TPM,request)=dec(m2,skMS) in 
out(Ch,enc((sign(result,skMS),IDx,request,n2), 
    pkService)) 
 
let service = 
in(privChS,skService) 
in(Ch,m5) 
  let(resultReceived,ID,request,nx2) =  
      dec(m5,skService) in 





let pkFR = pk(skFR) in 
let pkMS = pk(skMS) in 




!(user) || !(fingerprintReader) || !(service)  
  || !(matchingServer) 
  
Figure 2: ProVerif model for the communication messages 
 
B. Analysis 
Analysing the security properties of the proposed protocol 
is essential. The intended security properties of the protocol 
are evaluated to guarantee the proposed security features. The 
proposed protocol is analysed using ProVerif which analyses 
attacks on the proposed protocol based on Dolev-Yao style 
adversary and the defined attack is handled in the query 
attacker command (as illustrated below). Based on the 
designed protocol, the analysis part is intended to interpret the 
secrecy property and replay attack property. 
To verify the secrecy of the biometric data, query attacker: 
FP is analysed. Here, FP represents fingerprint data in the 
authentication process. The consequence of this analysis 
shows that an attacker cannot reach FP. Hence, the user’s 
fingerprint data is kept secret in the security protocol. 
To be able to verify whether an intruder presenting his 
biometric data to the system is actually inserting the captured 
positive matching result of the previous transaction of the 
legitimate user, leads to success in the authentication process 
in the protocol. The query attacker : result is illustrated to 
verify if an intruder could be able to obtain the matching 
result and replay it as if they are the legitimate users. A 
positive result from the analysis shows that a replay attack of 




V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
We propose a fingerprint authentication protocol in the 
unsupervised situation. The objective of the protocol is to 
protect the secrecy of the authentic user’s biometric data; 
fingerprint data, ensuring that the user’s purpose is legitimate, 
and authentication should be assured. The Trusted Platform 
Module is introduced to protect the system from being 
tampered with by an intruder. The liveness detection of the 
fingerprint reader guarantees that the fingerprint data 
presented to the protocol comes from a live presenter. Such a 
configuration overcomes one of the major complications in 
unsupervised fingerprint authentication. The transmission of 
the data is secured using public key cryptography. 
Additionally, the protocol confirms that the positive 
biometric authentication matching result can not be 
successfully replayed and used by an intruder, thus 
guaranteeing the authenticity of the data, as being original 
from a live source. 
The advantage of the proposed protocol over previous 
solutions of the biometric authentication protocol is in the way 
that the proposed protocol can detect and guarantee the liveness 
of the biometric data being used in the authentication process. 
Previous attempts to preserve the privacy of the user could not 
be applied in situations where the identity of the user must be 
presented, such as in remote bank transaction. The proposed 
protocol confirms the authenticity of the user and provides 




[1]  M. Barbosa, et al., "Secure biometric authentication with improved 
accuracy" in ACISP, New York:Springer, vol. 5107, pp. 21-36, 2008. 
[2] D. Hartung, C. Busch, “Biometric Transaction Authentication 
Protocol, in Proc. of int. Conf. on Emerging Security Information, 
Systems, and Technologies, 2010, pp. 207–215. 
[3] E. Syta,et al., ”Private Eyes: Secure Remote Biometric 
Authentication,” in Proc. 12th Int. Joint Conf.  on e-Business and 
Telecommunications 
(ICETE), Colmar, France 2015, pp. 243-250. 
[4] A. K. Jain, et al., “Biometrics: A grand challenge,”  in Proc. 17th Int. 
Conf. on Pattern recognition, Cambridge, UK, 2004, pp. 935–942. 
[5] S.M. Mudholkar, P.M. Shende, M.V. Sarode, “Biometrics 
authentication technique for intrusion detection systems using 
fingerprint recognition,”  Int. J. Computer Science, Engineering and 
Information Technology, vol.2, no.1, pp. 57-65, 2012. 
[6] G. Lowe, “Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key 
protocol using FDR,” in Proc. 2nd  Int. Workshop on Tools and 
Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, London, UK, 
1996, pp. 147–166. 
[7] G. Lowe, “Towards a completeness result for model checking of 
security protocols,” J. Computer Security, vol. 7, no.2-3, pp.89-146, 
1999. 
[8] A. Armando, et al., “The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of 
Internet security protocols and applications,” in Proc. 17th Int. Conf.  
Computer Aided Verification, Scotland, UK, 2005, pp.281–285. 
[9] B. Blanchet, B. Smyth, “ProVerif 1.93: Automatic cryptographic 
protocol verifier, user manual and tutorial,”  [Internet] [cited June 
2016], Available from : 
https://www.bensmyth.com/publications/2010-ProVerif-manual-
version-1.93/. 
[10] C. Cremers, “The Scyther tool”, [Internet] [cited   June 2016], 
Available from : https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/ people/cas.cremers/scyther/. 
[11] T. Matsumoto, H. Matsumoto, K. Yamada, S. Hoshino, “Impact of 
Artificial Gummy  Fingers on Fingerprint Systems,” in Proc. SPIE 
Vol.4677. Optical Security and Counterfeit Deterrence Techniques IV, 
CA, USA, 2002, pp. 1-18. 
[12] A. Ross, A.K. Jain, “Biometrics : When Identity Matters,” in Advance 
in biometric person authentication, 1st ed., Guangzhou: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 1-2. 
A Secure Fingerprint Authentication Protocol 
 e-ISSN: 2289-8131   Vol. 10 No. 1-5 63 
[13] Tusted Computing Group. TPM main specification [Internet] [cited 
June 2016], Available from :  
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tpm-main-specification/. 
[14] D. Dolev, A.C. Yao, “On the Security of Public Key Protocols,” IEEE 
Trans.Information Theory, vol. 29, no.2, pp. 198-208, 1983.
 
 
 
 
